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ABSTRACT 
Inter-municipal cooperation in public service delivery has attracted the interest of 
local authorities seeking to reform public service provision recently. Cost saving, 
together with better quality and coordination, has been among the most important 
drivers of such cooperation. However, the empirical results on inter-municipal cooperation 
and its associated costs offer contradictory outcomes. We conduct a meta-regression analysis 
we seek to explain this discrepancy. We also formulate several hypotheses regarding scale 
economies, transaction costs, and governance of cooperation. While we find no clear 
indications of the role played by transaction costs in the relationship between cooperation 
and service delivery costs, we find strong evidence that population size and governance 
are significant in explaining the relationship. Specifically, small populations and 
delegation to a higher tier of government seem to offer cost advantages to cooperating 
municipalities. As an extension of our model, we seek to disentangle service-related 
transaction costs based on asset specificity and ease of measurability of the service. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The growing skepticism expressed by local governments towards private-sector participation 
in public service provision, and the different fiscal and economic constraints these governments 
face in terms of efficiency and effectiveness, have led many local authorities to devise new 
forms of public service delivery. In recent decades, one of the alternatives most frequently 
adopted has been inter-municipal cooperation (IMC), within a context of increasing 
cooperation between governments, local councils, agencies and political parties (Bouckaert, 
Peters and Verhoest, 2010). IMC is seen as a tool that can lower costs by exploiting economies 
of scale, while maintaining greater control over production, something that is not readily 
achievable with privatization (Levin and Tadelis, 2010; Hefetz and Warner, 2012). 
While long-term IMC agreements can be justified on the grounds of public values such 
as benefits of enhanced cross-jurisdictional coordination, service quality and inter-municipal 
reciprocity, this usually applies to IMC agreements based on positive past experience regarding 
interpersonal trust, reputation and sanctioning power. Concerns over stability, equity and 
universality are also stimulate cooperation, (Aldag and Warner, 2018). Yet the main rationale 
for such partnership is to cut costs. However, the empirical evidence obtained from various 
countries and services does not systematically confirm the cost-saving potential of IMC 
agreements. While context may be important in explaining the contradictory results reported 
in the literature, this is not in itself an adequate explanation (Feiock, 2007). 
Here, therefore, the chief motivation underpinning our research is to account for the 
divergence in the outcomes reported for IMC agreements, and to explore the factors that best 
explain this variation. In this way, policy makers should have more realistic expectations about 
cooperation. We take advantage of the booming empirical literature over the last decade, and 
seek to reconcile seemingly contradictory results by means of meta-regression analysis [see, 
for other aspects of local service delivery, Bel and Fageda, 2009; Bel, Fageda, and Warner, 
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2010; Bel and Warner, 2016]. 
Our paper makes three main contributions to the literature. First, to create the database 
for our meta-regression analysis, we review all available (to the best of our knowledge) 
multivariate empirical studies that analyze the cost-saving effects of IMC. This includes both 
published and unpublished papers. Second, based on a prior analysis of the theoretical 
background underpinning IMC, we study the causes of this variation in results. To do this, we 
design a multivariate model to check the theoretical outcomes empirically. Specifically, we 
focus on the effects of economies of scale, transaction costs, and governance arrangements for 
IMC. Third, and by way of extension, we further analyze the role of transaction costs based on 
asset specificity and ease of measurability/contract management difficulty, to better understand 
the nature and the effects of transaction costs based on their components.  
We organize the paper as follows. First, we review the theoretical background and 
analyze theory-based outcomes or propositions. Based on this review, we then formulate our 
hypotheses regarding economies of scale, transaction costs and governance arrangements. 
Second, we review the multivariate empirical evidence about the effects of IMC on costs.1 We 
then explain how the database was built and the choices we made to ensure homogeneity. Next, 
we formulate a multivariate model and present the results from our estimations, which we 
discuss generally, and also with special attention to the relationship with our theoretical 
hypotheses. We also offer an extension of our model that should be useful in tracing the effects 
 
1 We are aware that other empirically based evidence on shared delivery and costs has been published, 
although it is quite scarce (Holzer and Fry, 2011). For instance, Honadle (1984) and Ruggini (2006) 
provide anecdotal information about savings in several cases surveyed in the USA. In contrast, various 
Australian case studies do not show cost savings (Dollery, Akimov, and Byrnes, 2009). Because meta-
regression deals solely with multivariate studies, we do not provide specific details of these studies, but 
rather concentrate on what we identified as our main target. 
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of transaction costs, based on the nature of the specific public services under analysis. Finally, 
we present the results of the robustness tests, and draw the main conclusions and policy 
implications from our analysis. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Efficient service provision based on IMC has been discussed essentially in terms of the theory 
of local public economics, within the framework of institutional collective action, and in 
relation to the principal-agent problem in collaborative governance. In their review of existing 
evidence on IMC and costs, Bel and Warner (2016) classified the relevant factors into three 
groups: scale-related costs; organizational characteristics and service-related transaction costs; 
and governance arrangements. Here, we adopt this same classification and analyze these factors 
separately. Before doing so, we should stress that it is not our objective to provide a 
comprehensive analysis of the theoretical factors underlying IMC; rather, we choose to focus 
on those that are most relevant to the empirical analysis we conduct herein. 
Economies of Scale 
One of the key motives for adopting IMC is to improve the scale at which a service is delivered, 
given that municipalities may be of suboptimal size, reflecting the fact that they are usually the 
outcome of historical/cultural events and do not adhere to any obvious economic/geographic 
rationale. This means jurisdictional boundaries can be redefined to improve scale and 
internalize spillover effects. However, certain trade-off relations need to be borne in mind. 
Mirrlees (1972) explained optimum town size in relation to such conditions as individual 
preferences regarding consumption, distance from work, area occupied by the individual’s 
residence and population density in the immediate neighborhood. Similarly, Dixit (1973) 
argued that it is simply unrealistic not to include the benefits of scale economies in economic 
models, and proposed a model for determining the optimum size and arrangement of a 
monocentric city. In this model, he also considered the trade-off between economies of scale 
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and diseconomies of congestion, for instance in commuter transport. 
Taking a different perspective, Ladd (1992) examined the effect of population growth 
and density on the cost and quality of public services. She found that a higher population 
density lowers provision costs and described a U-shaped relationship between output and 
population density. Her study served to confirm that there are certain optimal boundary 
conditions, and that while economies of scale can be achieved initially, as size increases scale 
benefits become exhausted. For this reason, scale economies can be potentially advantageous 
– above all for smaller municipalities – since with increasing capacity average production costs 
should fall and greater efficiency should be achieved (Hulst and van Montfort, 2011).  
One way to modify boundaries for the purpose of service delivery is by means of IMC 
(Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren, 1961). As has been emphasized by many scholars (i.e. Bel and 
Costas, 2006; Warner and Bel, 2008; Hefetz, Warner, and Vigoda-Gadot, 2012; da Cruz and 
Marques, 2012), IMC provides a market alternative, which allows a service to continue under 
public delivery while enjoying the advantages of scale economies. However, it should be borne 
in mind that the optimal scale differs for each local public service. Hence, IMC can provide a 
better alternative than that of amalgamation (which can be considered as generalized – and 
usually compulsory – cooperation) to profit from scale economies. 
Most empirical papers report a negative effect of population on the frequency of 
cooperation (Levin and Tadelis, 2010; Hefetz, Warner, and Vigoda-Gadot, 2012; Bel, Fageda, 
and Mur, 2014), that is, as the size of the municipalities grows, IMC tends to be less cost-
advantageous for the participating municipalities. This belief that IMC is especially beneficial 
for smaller municipalities has been addressed from other perspectives as well. For instance, 
Warner and Hefetz (2002, 2003) and Mohr, Deller, and Halstead (2010) emphasize that small 
municipalities are less likely than larger municipalities to use competitive bidding. However, 
it is worth noting that the relationship between population size and cooperation can be 
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ambiguous when multiservice cooperation is considered (Bel and Warner 2016).  
Theoretically, therefore, we expect the scale of cooperation to be a significant variable. In 
the empirical literature, the usual proxy employed for scale is the municipality’s average 
population or output. As such, our first hypothesis states: 
Hypothesis 1: Studies of small municipalities tend to find inter-municipal cooperation more 
cost-advantageous. 
Organizational Characteristics and Service-Related Transaction Costs 
The importance of transaction costs is stressed by Williamson (1999) in accounting for 
inefficiencies in public bureaucracy. Moreover, he argues that the choice of service delivery 
method varies according to service type. Building on Williamson’s insights, researchers have 
analyzed the characteristics and nature of transaction costs by looking at the nature of a wide 
range of public services. Brown and Potoski (2003, 2005) revamped the analysis of service-
related transaction costs in delivery choices, by focusing on asset specificity and the 
ease/difficulty of measurement. Levin and Tadelis (2010) adopted a similar approach to that of 
Brown and Potoski (2003), but also included in their theoretical proposal service 
characteristics, which they defined as contracting difficulty and resident sensitivity, especially 
as related to quality. Later, Hefetz and Warner (2012) analyzed service characteristics in terms 
of asset specificity, contract management difficulty, citizen interest, and market competition. 
Indeed, the indexes of asset specificity proposed by Brown and Potoski (2005) and Hefetz and 
Warner (2012), and of the ease/difficulty of measurement (Brown and Potoski, 2005) and 
contract management (Hefetz and Warner, 2012) are of key relevance to the empirical analysis 
we conduct herein. 
According to transaction cost theory, if delivering a service requires specialized 
investments, and if performance measurement is difficult, that service will incur high 
transaction costs (Brown and Potoski 2003, 2005). In such a scenario, privatization is less 
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likely. This insight is based on the idea that agents act in their own self-interest and do not 
cooperate (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In partnerships, however, which are likely to be based 
on trust and mutual commitment between participants, these theoretical outcomes may change 
(Brown and Potoski, 2005). As such, IMC appears better suited to the latter scenario. 
Furthermore, cooperation can lead to interactive learning (Hefetz and Warner, 2012). 
Alternatively, it can be argued that transaction costs in the case of IMC are likely to be 
high, since participants will incur information and coordination costs, negotiation and division 
costs, enforcement and monitoring costs and bargaining costs, as defined by Feiock (2007). 
We return to these potential costs in the following subsection. However, as Brown (2008) 
pointed out, cooperation costs do not have to be high. Municipalities tend to place greater trust 
in other public partners in the case of services exposed to a high risk of opportunism. By way 
of example, in the case of health and human services, the author concludes that this might occur 
because governments have similar structures and goals; hence, they are inherently perceived 
by each other as being more trustworthy. Moreover, although some service-related investments 
might be high (which usually coincides with high transaction costs), if we consider that inter-
municipal cooperation is likely to include cost sharing, the results of cooperation can be 
positive. However, ease of measurement might not necessarily improve with cooperation, 
which in a broader sense also refers to the difficulties encountered in contract specification and 
monitoring (Hefetz and Warner, 2012). Likewise, inter-municipal contracting is more likely to 
be beneficial for those services for which competition is very low. This can also be explained 
in terms of transaction costs, since if a market is not competitive enough, it will require a much 
greater effort on the part of the government to secure and monitor the service at an efficient 
and effective level (Girth et al., 2012).  
Based on the theoretical outcomes of the aforementioned studies our next hypothesis states: 
Hypothesis 2: Transaction costs in the context of inter-municipal cooperation have a 
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beneficial effect on cost savings. 
Governance Arrangements 
Engaging in IMC implies that decision-making is externalized, either partially or totally 
(Argento et al, 2010: 45&50) and, because of this, multiple problems related to collective action 
are likely to arise (Feiock, 2007; Voorn, van Genugten, and van Thiel, 2017; Silvestre, 
Marques, and Gomes, 2018). Indeed, the transaction costs related to governance arrangements 
can be high in the case of cooperation, because participants have to face the costs – of 
information and coordination, negotiation and division, enforcement and monitoring and 
bargaining – identified in the previous subsection (Feiock, 2007). Moreover, as Ostrom (1990) 
pointed out, trust and norms of reciprocity are also of importance in IMC (see, in this regard, 
Thurmaier and Wood, 2002), and these can develop through networks (Carr, LeRoux and 
Shrestha, 2009; Shrestha and Feiock. 2011). It would seem that trust and commitment are, 
effectively, critical for inter-municipal cooperation to work, making IMC a viable form of 
public service delivery (Silvestre, Marques, and Gomes, 2018). 
 IMC governance can take the form of informal agreements, formal contracts between 
the parties, joint-bodies for governance, or the delegation of power and resources to supra-
municipal bodies -government or agency- (Hulst et al, 2009; Bel and Warner, 2015, 2016). A 
common characteristic of all these IMC arrangements is the option available to a municipality 
to withdraw from the collaboration as and when it wishes. Cooperation is voluntary (unlike the 
situation in an amalgamation), so opting-out is a viable reaction to undesired outcomes, or to 
exploitation by more powerful partners. 
IMC is subject to potential risks. Marvel and Marvel (2007) found that monitoring can 
be a relevant issue, if services are provided internally or by another nonprofit or governmental 
service provider. In such cases, monitoring is either externalized along with the service or the 
level of monitoring falls. Significant problems of coordination (Lowery, 2000; Feiock, 2007; 
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Tavares and Feiock, forthcoming) and political transaction costs (Tavares and Camöes, 2007; 
Rodrigues, Tavares, and Araújo, 2012; Bergholz and Bischoff, forthcoming; Tavares and 
Feiock, forthcoming) can also arise.  
By looking at IMC through the more structural lens provided by principal-agent theory, 
the main problem to emerge is that of multiple principals relating with one agent. As Gailmard 
(2009) shows theoretically, the existence of multiple principals raises a collective action 
problem in relation to monitoring, which can result in the level of oversight being inferior than 
that required to guarantee the principals’ joint interests. For this reason, even if the principals 
have interests in common, the institutional structure of the overseeing body plays a key role in 
relation to accountability. Because of this Voorn, Van Genugten, and Van Thiel (2017) have 
suggested the hypothesis that delegation can entail lower transaction costs than other 
alternative forms of government arrangements. The problem of multiple principals is further 
stressed by da Cruz and Marques (2012) and van Thiel (2016), among others, and has been 
found to be damaging for ICM outcomes by Sørensen (2007), Garrone, Grilli, and Rousseau 
(2013) and Blåka (2017a).  
Given the multiple principal problem, the option of delegating to a supramunicipal 
government or agency has gained increasing attention. This course of action is frequent in 
Spain – comarcas and mancomunidades (see Warner and Bel, 2008; Bel, Fageda and Mur, 
2014), France – communautés (see Frère, Leprince, and Paty, 2014) and, more recently, in Italy 
– Unione dei Comuni (see Ferraresi, Migali, and Rizzo, 2018). With governance arrangements 
of this type, the relation is limited to one principal and one agent. The principal has incentives 
to consider the interests of all the municipalities involved in the IMC agreement, as each 
municipality can opt out and leave. Furthermore, these supramunicipal governments typically 
manage cooperation in different services and, because of this, economies of scale and scope in 
monitoring and coordination can be exploited (Bel and Costas, 2006; Bovaird, 2014). Hence, 
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the delegation of power and resources to a supramunicipal government or agency can help 
minimize monitoring and coordination costs, while enabling participants to reap benefits of 
cost-related economies of scale. In line with this reasoning, we formulate our next hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3: Delegation to a supramunicipal government tends to make intermunicipal 
cooperation more cost-advantageous. 
 
IMC AND COSTS: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
The multivariate empirical literature on the effects of inter-municipal cooperation on costs is 
recent, the first papers published on the topic being Bel and Costas (2006) and Sorensen (2007). 
Thereafter, this literature has grown rapidly, as documented in Bel and Warner (2015). In the 
last few years it has undergone a veritable boom, with an expansion in the coverage of countries 
and services considered. While the early studies typically focused on solid waste management, 
subsequent studies have examined many other services, with studies being conducted (in 
chronological order) for Spain, Norway, the Netherlands, Italy, France, Czech Republic, 
Sweden, Germany and the USA. Below, we briefly review this literature. 
Spain  
The earliest study analyzed solid waste management in the region of Catalonia (Bel and Costas, 
2006), and examined the relationship between costs and production mode. While the mode of 
production (public or private) did not show significant effects on the costs of refuse collection, 
IMC was found to reduce the costs for small municipalities. The Stevens (1978)-type cost 
function used in this empirical study has been followed in many subsequent studies, facilitating 
robust comparisons. Later papers by Bel and Mur (2009) and Bel, Fageda, and Mur (2014) 
focused their attention on the Spanish region of Aragon and drew on data from a number of 
different years. In these papers, the authors reported that cooperation reduced costs for smaller 
municipalities. As both these regions (i.e. Catalonia and Aragon) share the trait of having 
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higher tiers of government to which functions and resources are transferred for IMC, the 
authors suggest that delegation can be an advantageous way in which to organize IMC 
governance.  
Zafra-Gómez et al. (2013) analyzed waste management for a state-wide sample, 
according to the forms of delivery adopted by Spain’s small and medium-sized municipalities. 
The authors considered various forms of IMC (mancomunidad, consortium, mancomunidad 
under contract, and supramunicipal management via provincial, county or public companies). 
They found that IMC reduces costs with respect to single municipal management. Pérez-López, 
Prior, and Zafra-Gómez (2015) confirmed these findings in a study that expanded the number 
of services under consideration. Further studies by Pérez-López et al. (2016) and Pérez-López, 
Prior, and Zafra-Gómez (2018) have analyzed the effect of cooperation on municipal efficiency 
using different techniques (order-m frontiers, and DEA panel data estimations, respectively), 
and find that, with IMC, smaller municipalities (up to 20,000 inhabitants) show higher 
efficiency in waste collection. In a recent article Zafra-Gómez and Chica-Olmo (2018) 
investigate the spillover effects of different management forms on costs. They confirm based 
on a sample of 670 Spanish municipalities for the period of 2002-2010 that inter-municipal 
cooperation of a given municipality has a cost-saving effect on the neighboring municipality 
with distances up to 120 km. 
Scandinavian Countries 
One of the first papers to examine this question was Sørensen (2007), who studied solid waste 
collection in Norwegian municipalities. The author compared two theoretical approaches to 
IMC in the Scandinavian context: on the one hand, corporate governance theory, which holds 
that indirect and dispersed ownership incur high agency costs; and, on the other, standard 
political economy, which suggests that introducing distance between politicians and decisions 
might increase service delivery efficiency. Sørensen’s results show that, in Norway, IMC is 
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responsible for efficiency losses that are higher than the benefits obtained from scale 
economies. Remaining in Norway, Blåka (2017a) studied fire and rescue services in a 
comparison of hypotheses developed under institutional collective action and corporate 
governance theories, respectively. Her findings indicate that the cost-saving feature of 
cooperation depends heavily on its organizational form. Costs are lower for IMC under 
contractual agreements, but cost-saving significantly decreases with the number of partners.2 
Holmgren and Weinholt (2016) analyzed the cost of fire and rescue services in Swedish 
municipalities by means of stochastic frontier analysis. Because Swedish fire and rescue 
services are increasingly formalizing cooperation between municipalities, and also 
collaborating with other actors, cooperation was introduced with these two variables: i.e. 
formalized IMC and cooperation with other actors. Both were expected to reduce inefficiency, 
but the outcomes were mixed: while cooperation with other actors increased efficiency, the 
effect of cooperation between municipalities was not significant.  
The Netherlands  
Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2013) analyzed waste collection in Dutch municipalities based on data 
for the period 1998-2010, using a standard cost function for a long panel dataset. They found 
cost savings with IMC. The same authors conducted a follow-up study with very similar 
characteristics, in which they controlled for provincial and municipal fixed effects, and found 
a decreasing significance of cost savings with IMC (Dijkgraaf and Gradus, 2014). The same 
decreasing significance of cost savings was recorded when they controlled for the impact of 
various unit-based pricing systems on the quantity of waste produced by different streams. 
Other papers have been published recently for the Netherlands. Niaounakis and Blank 
(2017) analyzed efficiency in relation to cooperation between tax departments, and found that 
 
2 Although its content goes beyond our main objective here, it is worth noting Blåka (2017b) on the 
effects of cooperation on service quality, an issue for which very little empirical research has been done. 
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municipalities with a threshold population of 60,000 inhabitants had already exhausted their 
scale economies, and that IMC stopped being advantageous above that threshold. In the case 
of municipalities engaged in cooperation, they conclude that, whereas costs may increase 
initially, IMC does reduce costs over time. Allers and de Greef (2018) have confirmed the costs 
savings to be gained from IMC in the case of tax collection in Dutch municipalities. However, 
they found no evidence of cost-saving when considering total public spending. Geertsema 
(2017) has looked at the interest rate levels of municipalities engaged in IMC and of those 
working in amalgamation as a proxy for efficiency, and finds that IMC organizations pay a 
higher interest rate. In contrast, the difference is not significant in the case of amalgamations. 
Finally, Klok et al. (2018) have recently investigated perceived transaction costs, benefits and 
trust attributable to IMC, and find that smaller municipalities are more positive about the 
perceived benefits of cooperation and that perceived results depend on the form of cooperation. 
Italy  
Garrone, Grilli, and Rousseau (2013) studied joint, inter-municipal ventures in Italy, with a 
sample made up of multi-utility firms (providing water, electricity, gas and waste management 
services). They found that coordination costs increased significantly for such firms, an 
expenditure that outweighed the potential cost savings from cooperation. A quite different type 
of IMC, that undertaken by the Unione dei Comune (municipal unions, with clear similarities 
with Spain’s mancomunidades), is analyzed by Ferraresi, Migali, and Rizzo (2018). Their 
empirical analysis focuses on Emilia Romagna and Toscana and employs difference-in-
differences and propensity score matching methods. Their results suggest that being a member 
of a municipal union reduces a municipality’s total per capita expenditure, and that this effect 
is increasing in a period of up to six years after joining the union. Finally, Giacomini, Sancino, 
and Simonetto (2018) have recently used survey-based data to examine perceptions in small 
municipalities and found significant expectations that cooperation can contribute to cost 
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reduction, better quality, and institutional legitimacy. 
France  
French experiences with IMC and its effects on local expenditure were analyzed by Frère, 
Leprince, and Paty (2014). In this paper, the authors examined the effect of fiscal cooperation 
over the period 1994-2003. The authors draw two main conclusions: i) cooperation has no 
significant effect on public spending levels, and ii) there are no spending interactions within 
the cooperating organization. 
Czech Republic  
Soukopová and Klimovský (2016a, 2016b) analyzed solid waste management in the region of 
South Moravia for 2013 and 2015 respectively, again using a standard cost function, and found 
that IMC has cost-saving effects. Soukopová et al. (2016) then extended this study of solid 
waste management to the whole of the Czech Republic and found that IMC increased costs, 
contrary to the findings of the previous study. This contradiction triggered a series of follow-
up studies in the country. Soukopová, Vaceková, and Klimovský (2017), Soukopová and 
Vaceková (2018), and Soukopová and Sládeček (2018) undertook analyses in which they 
introduced variations in terms of municipality size, the time period of their databases, and the 
regions specifically included. Overall, these studies have found that IMC reduces costs, the 
most significant values being recorded for small municipalities, but they show that these 
savings disappear with increasing municipal population size.  
Germany  
Blaeschke and Haug (2018) have recently examined the effects of IMC on the efficiency of the 
wastewater sector in the region of Hessen. Using a two-stage data envelopment analysis, they 
find that IMC is related to lower levels of technical efficiency. However, smaller municipalities 
can benefit from scale economies through cooperation. Using a metafrontier analysis of 
efficiency, the authors once again show that cooperation gains from scale economies are 
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probably off-set by technical inefficiencies. Furthermore, they conclude that scale effects apply 
primarily to small municipalities. 
United States  
The effects of cooperation in the US have been studied by Bel, Qian, and Warner (2016) by 
drawing on survey-based data from a large sample of municipalities in New York State in 2013. 
The analysis examines a wide range of services and finds conflicting results. This indicates that 
the cost-saving potential of IMC depends on the characteristics of each service. The authors 
found that cooperation in police, library, road and highway services reduced costs at the 1% 
level of significance, while it was effective in garbage and landfill management at the 10% 
level. For the remaining services no significant effects were found. 
DATA 
To create a comprehensive database that includes all studies of the effects of IMC on costs and 
to obtain a representative and unbiased dataset, we conducted a search of the following 
academic literature database services between April and July 2018: EconLit, Social Science 
Research Network, AgEcon and Repec-Ideas. So as to include unpublished studies and “gray 
literature” too, we searched the following websites: OpenSIGLE, NBER, National Technical 
Information Service in the US, US GAO, E-Thesis Online Services, and European Science 
Research Council. In both cases we used the following key-words: ‘inter-municipal 
cooperation’, ‘interlocal cooperation’, ‘interlocal contracting’, ‘joint contracting’ and ‘shared 
delivery’. Additionally, we also conducted a search using the same key-words on Google 
Scholar. Finally, we reviewed the citations in all the papers we had identified that way. In all, 
we identified 28 multivariate empirical studies of the effects of IMC on costs, broadly 
considered.  
After completing a brief literature review (see previous section), we next defined the 
rules for the inclusion of studies in the metaregression. Our main selection criterion was to 
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ensure the homogeneity of the definition of variables included in our database. After applying 
this criterion for inclusion, we then extracted the required data from the individual studies. 
First, the list was confined to those studies in which the costs associated with cooperation were 
considered as the dependent variable when compared to the costs of individual municipalities.
3 
We then checked whether IMC was defined homogenously in the papers.4 After confirming 
the homogeneity of the studies included in the meta-regression analysis, we next sought to 
ensure the homogeneity of the data for our moderators and our theory-related variables. To do 
this, we contacted several authors in order to obtain data on the average population of the 
municipalities included in the estimations.5 After all these refinements, we ended up with a 
database comprising 18 published and unpublished studies, with a total of 111 estimations. 
Throughout this process, we carefully adhered to the Meta-Analysis of Economics Research 
Reporting Guidelines set out in Stanley et al. (2013). 
Table 1 shows the studies included in our database for the meta-regression, with their 
 
3 We had to exclude cases where the dependent variable was efficiency indicator (Holmgren and 
Weinholt, 2016; Pérez-López et al., 2016; Pérez-López, Prior, and Zafra-Gómez, 2018), interest rates 
(Geertsema, 2017), management costs incurred by the public utility firm (Garrone, Grilli & Rousseau, 
2013), volume of drinking water (Blaeschke and Haug, 2018), as well as perceptions of transaction 
costs and benefits (Klok et al., 2018), and overall cost perceptions (Giacomini, Sancino, and Simonetto, 
2018). 
4 In this step we had to discard two studies that estimated more than one type of cooperation at the same 
time: Pérez-López, Prior, and Zafra-Gómez (2015), Zafra-Gómez et al. (2013) and Zafra-Gómez,  and 
Chica-Olmo (2018). 
5 In this way, we obtained additional data from Dijkgraaf and Gradus, (2013, 2014), Soukopova et al 
(2016), Soukopová, Vaceková and Klimovský (2017), Ferraresi, Migali, and Rizzo (2018), Soukopová 
and Sládeček (2018), and Soukopová and Vaceková (2018). 
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main characteristics. We have useful information on studies conducted for Spain, Norway, the 
Netherlands, Czech Republic, France, Italy and the US. As for the specific services, they 
include a wide range of fields in which municipalities cooperate. Of the 111 estimations, 23 
are drawn from either book chapters, conference papers or other unpublished studies. In total, 
20% of the estimates come from unpublished work. Moreover, two third of the estimates are 
drawn from panel data. 
Our database includes information on the service(s) considered, the region and/or 
country for which the study was conducted, the type of collaborative governance arrangement, 
the year(s) for which the data were obtained, the sample size, the type of estimation, and the 
overall results for the variable of interest. All these are shown in Table 1.  
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2005 211-311 2 Cross-
Section 
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and Mur (2014) 




2008 80 2 Cross-
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Saves costs 
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Klimovsky 
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solid waste South Moravia 
– Czech Rep. 




Soukopova &     
Klimovsky 
(2016b) 
solid waste South Moravia 
– Czech Rep. 





et al. (2016) 
solid waste Czech 
Republic 
several forms 2013 365 1 Cross-
Section 
Increases costs 
Niaounakis &  
Blank (2017) 
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3686 17 Panel cooperation saves 
costs 








3331 36 Panel Mixed results  
Bel, Qian and several New York St.- Several forms 2013 40-848 13 Cross- Savings for police, 
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Warner (WP) services US Section library, roads & 
highways, and solid 
waste. No effect for 
other services 
Note: ‘Multiservice’ indicates that the study did not differentiate between services. ‘Several services’ indicates 
that different services were considered in the study, and almost all or all the estimations in these studies were 
made for single services. 
Source: Authors 
 
Furthermore, the database includes other statistical information, namely coefficients, t-
statistics and standard errors for the variable of interest, the regression method, and the 
transformation to transaction costs, as we explain below. In addition, we constructed dummy 
variables for delegation, to consider if the study looked at the US or at European countries, and 





Because the aim of this paper is to analyze the divergence in the outcomes of studies examining 
the effect of IMC on service costs, we opted to employ a meta-regression methodology to 
explain the variation in results. This methodology has been widely used, for example, in 
psychotherapy and in studies of expectations and different types of elasticity, etc. (Jarrell and 
Stanley, 1989) as well as to analyze the effects of privatization on the costs of local public 
service delivery (Bel, Fageda and Warner, 2010), the effects of private/public ownership on 
the productivity of local water services (Carvalho, Marques and Berg, 2012), the factors 
explaining the choice of the privatization of local public services (Bel and Fageda, 2009), and 
the factors that account for the choice of IMC (Bel and Warner, 2016). The standard 
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econometric model has the following structure: 
 
𝑌 = 𝑋𝛽 + 𝜀 (1) 
 
In this way, we can explain both the determinants of an event or phenomena and their 
importance and magnitude. If, however, we want to explain reported differences we require a 
model that can synthesize the various findings. The structure proposed by Jarrell and Stanley 
(1989) is as follows: 
𝐾 





where 𝑏𝑗, the observed dependent variable, is the reported coefficient of the true effect - β from 
the 𝑗th study out of the set of 𝐿 studies. The other part of the equation includes the “meta-part”, 
in which 𝛼𝑘 represents the meta-regression coefficients, 𝑍𝑗𝑘 the meta-independent variables that 
capture the systematic variations between studies and 𝑒𝑗 is the meta-regression disturbance 
term. Thus, the studies’ different results cause differences in 𝑍𝑗𝑘 and 𝛼𝑘 is the average biases 
introduced by the misspecification of the studies. From a practical point of view, instead of 
using the reported coefficients for 𝑏𝑗, it is customary to use the ratio between the reported 
coefficient and the standard error, i.e. the t-value. This is the case because in studies using 
different data sets, sample sizes and model specifications, the variances of the coefficients are 
likely to be different, and so the meta-regression errors will be heteroscedastic. In this paper, 
we also use the t-values for the estimations (either as reported in the original study or as 
calculated from the standard errors).6  
 
6 Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2013) and Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2014) did not report any of these values, so 
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To conduct our estimations, we formulate the following equation:  
 
𝑡−𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖 = 𝛼0 +𝛼1𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 +𝛼2𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑖 +𝛼3𝑈𝑆𝑖 +𝛼4𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 +𝛼5𝑃𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑖 
+𝛼6𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜n  +𝛼7T𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖  +𝛼8Delegationi + 𝑒i                                               (3) 
 
Hence, our model includes eight variables. The first five are the usual moderators 
related to the environmental or technical characteristics of each study. The last three are 
variables that reflect theoretical expectations concerning the results: Population, 
TransactionCosts and Delegation. 
As argued above, one of the most important drivers of IMC is the achievement of 
optimal boundary levels with the lowest average costs for the provision of a given service. By 
extending these boundaries, municipalities’ scale economies can be a good way to reduce costs. 
In the studies included in our dataset, the variable representing output is the number of 
inhabitants. This figure is determined here by data availability and the results are also readily 
double-checked. Thus, we examine Hypothesis 1 based on the average population of the 
municipalities included in the estimations. We expect this variable to be significant and to 
present a positive sign, reflecting the fact that the cost advantages of IMC tend to be more 
frequent in studies of small municipalities.  
Hypothesis 2 was formulated to reflect the expected decreasing effect on costs (negative 
relationship) of service-related transaction costs with IMC. We have constructed 
TransactionCosts as a categorical variable, taking stock of the ratings and indicators provided 
by Brown and Potoski (2005) [B&P Index] and by Hefetz and Warner (2012) [H&F Index]. 
The variable takes a value of zero if the transaction costs of the specific service in the estimation 
 
we asked the authors to provide us these details from their estimations.  
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is low (below average) according to the combined [B&P] and [H&F] indexes. A value of one 
corresponds to estimations that include many services (we assume this to be an intermediate 
position regarding transaction costs), and a value of two indicates relatively high transaction 
costs of a specific service, with respect to average values on the [B&P] and [H&F] indexes. In 
keeping with Hypothesis 2, we assume this variable to be negatively related to costs. Later, we 
extend our analysis and consider in greater detail the nature of transaction costs. 
The dummy representing Delegation captures the effect of the transfer of power and 
resources to a supramunicipal level of government, where decisions are made about the service 
delivery. This variable is of considerable relevance because it can be used to test Hypothesis 3 
as defined above. We expect this variable to be significant and to present a negative sign. Table 
2 summarizes information about our main variables, and Table 3 shows their descriptive 
statistics. 
 
Table 2. Variables used in the meta-regression analysis 
Variables Description   Expectation 
T-Value T-Value from each estimation   
SampleSize Number of observations of each estimation. None 
YearData Year of collection of data for the dependent variables None 
US Dummy variable with value one for studies on US, and 
zero otherwise 
None 
Multiservice Dummy taking the value of 1 for multi-services and 0 for 
single-service 
None 
Panel Dummy taking value of 1 if panel data is used in the 
study, 0 otherwise  
None 
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Population Average population in the municipality as reported Positive sign 
TransactionCosts Categorical variables taking value of zero (low TC), one 
(intermediate TC), or 2 (high TC)  
Negative sign 
Delegation Dummy variable that takes value 1 if there was 





Table 3. Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the meta-regression analysis 
Moderator variables Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
T-Value -1.267 2.850 -8.38 18.89 
SampleSize 2613.47 5312.20 39 28950 
YearData 2008.87 4.21 1999 2015 
US 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Multiservice 0.23 0.45 0 1 
Panel 0.66 0.48 0 1 
Population 20706.67 16644.66 235.79 101167 
TransactionCosts 0.51 0.64 0 2 
Delegation 0.29 0.46 0 1 




One of the potential threats to meta-analyses (and other methods based on literature reviews, 
in general) is that published studies have a greater tendency to report positive effects. This so-
called ‘publication bias’ (Card, Kluve, and Weber 2010) can greatly affect results, so in this 
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subsection we seek to evaluate whether it is present in our estimations. Funnel plots are a way 
of graphically evaluating potential ‘publication bias’ and are similar to scatter plots of studies; 
however, here one axis represents study precision (the inverse of standard error) and the square 
root of the sample size, and the other represents effect sizes (Card, 2012; Stanley 2008). If there 
is no ‘publication bias’, the funnel plot should give us symmetrically varying estimates around 
the ‘true effect’. At the bottom, studies with high standard errors (and, therefore, less precise) 
will be shown. Here, Figure 1 shows that there are more estimates on the negative side of the 
true effect; hence, it is probable that ‘publication bias’ is present. 
 
Figure 5.3: Funnel Plots for Precision and Size 
       
 
RESULTS 
Our results are shown in Table 4. We first estimated the model with ordinary least squares 
(OLS). After testing for heteroscedasticity (Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test: prob > 
chi2=0.000), we had to reject the null hypothesis of constant variance. Hence, we corrected the 
standard errors by conducting the estimation with robust OLS. The variance inflation factor 
(VIF) was 3.35. Hence, multicollinearity is not a relevant problem in our estimation.  
Table 4. Results from meta-regression  
 OLS Robust OLS GEE GLS 
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#Observations  111 111 111 111 
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Adjusted R-squared 0,285 0,337   
F-statistic 6.48*** 14.16***   
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-
Weisberg test (p>chi2) 
0.000    
VIF 3.35    
Wald(Chi)2   132.45 161422.87 
Prob>Chi2   0.000*** 0.000*** 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis.  
***Significant at 1% level; **Significant at 5% level; *Significant at 10% level 
 
 
The results show that two moderators, YearData and US, have no significant impact on 
the differences in results in the relationship between IMC and costs. In contrast, SampleSize 
shows some weak statistical significance (10% level) and presents a positive sign. Looking at 
the technical variables, Multiservice is significant at the 1% level and its coefficient presents a 
positive sign, which implies that studies that consider an aggregate set of services, in the 
delivery of which municipalities cooperate, tend to find IMC less advantageous in terms of 
costs. Of the other technical variables, Panel is significant at the 1% level and presents a 
negative sign, which indicates that studies based on panel data, as opposed to those that rely on 
cross-sectional analysis, tend to find inter-municipal cooperation more advantageous. As 
studies with panel data tend to provide more robust results, we can conclude that analytical 
robustness analysis is positively related with the cost advantages derived from cooperation. 
In the case of the theoretically based variables, Population was expected to be 
significant with a positive sign. Our results present the expected sign, and the variable is 
significant at the 5% level. This confirms Hypothesis 1, according to which IMC is more 
advantageous for small municipalities, but as their population grows they are less likely to reap 
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the benefits of scale economies as they may have been able to exploit them more fully without 
cooperation. However, these municipalities still incur coordination costs when engaging in 
cooperation. Hypothesis 2 states that these service-related TransactionCosts are positively 
related with the cost advantages of cooperation, and as such we expected a negative sign for 
this variable. However, we fail to find a significant relationship between service-related 
transaction costs and the results obtained in the studies, which would suggest a weak 
relationship between these costs and those of IMC. Finally, we sought to capture the effect of 
governance arrangements by means of our variable Delegation. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, 
we found Delegation to be statistically significant at the 1% level and to present a negative 
sign, which implies that delegating power and resources to a supramunicipal government when 
cooperating is associated with cost advantages for the cooperating municipalities. 
Next, because our sample is formed with observations from 18 studies, each of them 
containing a different number of estimations, we might be exposed to problems of dependence 
across observations (Nelson and Kennedy, 2009; Ringquist, 2013). To deal with within-study 
autocorrelation, we follow Ringquist’s (2013: 218) suggestion and employ generalized 
estimating equations (GEE) to estimate a random effects meta-regression model.7 In this way, 
we obtain both consistently estimated coefficients and standard errors. The GEE results, shown 
in the right-hand column of Table 4, are very similar to those from the robust OLS estimation. 
 
7 Nelson and Kennedy (2009) and Ringquist (2013) discuss other potential sources of dependence across 
observations, including common data sets and common research teams employed in distinct studies. 
Here, it should be stressed that in our database no data set was used in more than one study. In the case 
of research teams, note that studies attributable to the same researchers used different data sets, were 
usually undertaken in different jurisdictions and/or used different estimation techniques. For these 
reasons, we believe we have no other relevant problems of dependence across observations, apart from 
the number of estimations conducted in each study.  
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The only difference was presented by SampleSize, which was significant at the 10% level and 
now is significant at the 5% level, and in the same direction, significance of Panel decreases 
from 1% to 5%. On the contrary, Population now increases significance, at 1% level. As a 
check, we estimated a random effects generalized least squares model to determine the 
robustness of our results. Right-hand column in Table 4 shows the results. All the conclusions 
reported above continue to apply with the exception that the significance of Sample Size 
disappears, which makes us to be cautious about the results for this variable. 
 
AN EXTENSION OF THE ANALYSIS OF SERVICE-RELATED TRANSACTION 
COSTS 
The transaction costs associated with IMC are related to the characteristics of the collaboration 
activities in which the municipalities engage (Hawkins, 2017). By classifying the service-
related transaction costs, we can take into account the nature of the service provided, which 
should help disentangle the relationship between service-related transaction costs and IMC 
costs. The two characteristics we can focus on are, on the one hand, asset specificity; and, on 
the other, ease of measurement. Asset specificity can be defined as the level of specific physical 
infrastructure or technical knowledge needed, while ease of measurement can be defined as 
quantifiability in contractual terms (Brown, Potoski, and Van Slyke 2015). Based on these 
theoretical outcomes, we can formulate the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2a: Asset specificity is positively related to the cost advantages of IMC. 
Hypothesis 2b: Ease (difficulty) of measurement is negatively (positively) related to the cost 
advantages of IMC. 
To analyze these two hypotheses, we checked the studies that assessed services based 
on more than one of their dimensions. We took the indicators for asset specificity from Brown 
and Potoski (2005) and Hefetz and Warner (2012): AS_B&P and AS_H&W, respectively. The 
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ease of measurement indicator is taken from Brown and Potoski (2005): that is, EM_B&P, 
while the indicator of contract management difficulty (which embeds ease/difficulty of 
measurement) is taken from Hefetz and Warner (2012): that is CMD_H&W. We run GEE 
estimations by introducing each of these factors sequentially.8 Table 5 shows the results.  
  
 
8 We lost three observations when assigning TC measures from Brown and Potoski (2005) and Hefetz 
and Warner (2012) to services in estimations, because we could not assign precise values to youth 
recreation, economic development and promotion, and zoning and planning, all three from Bel, Qian, 
and Warner (2016). For estimations including various services, we used the average values for the 
measures in Brown and Potoski (2005) and Hefetz and Warner (2012). 
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Table 5. Asset specificity and ease of measurement 
Variables AS B&P E(D)M B&P AS H&W CMD H&F 
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CMD_H&W - - - -1.223** 
(0.581) 


















#observations 108 108 108 108 
Wald(Chi)2 216.09 96.40 99.39 108.37 
Prob>Chi2 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. ***Significant at 1% level; **Significant at 5% level; *Significant at 10% 
level 
 
It is worth noting that all significant variables, and particularly those theoretically 
grounded, above keep the same sign and level of significance across all estimations. Looking 
at transaction costs, when we consider AS_B&P and EM_B&P measures, we find that neither 
helps account for differences in the IMC cost results. However, when we include in the 
estimation the AS_H&W and the CMD_H&W measures a somewhat different picture emerges: 
both asset specificity and contract management difficulty are significant (the first one at the 
10% level and the second at the 5% level), and are associated with IMC cost advantages. Note 
however, that we need to be very cautious in our interpretation of these results. Indeed, they 
point to the need for further research to disentangle more fully the relationship between service-




As the funnel plot (Figure 1) shows, our sample might suffer from problems of ‘publication 
bias’. In this section we test for its presence and evaluate its relevance. First, we conducted the 
funnel asymmetry test (FAT) to check for the presence of ‘publication bias’ both in terms of 
study precision (FAT 1) and sample size (FAT 2), as recommended by Stanley (2008) and 
Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012). In the absence of any bias, the estimations should be 
randomly spread around the ‘true effect’. However, if the effect observed correlates with the 
standard error then we need to test whether the publication selection has a genuine effect 
(Stanley 2008). Additionally, Begg and Berlin (1988) argued that ‘publication bias’ can also 
be caused by overlooking the variability in sample sizes. If the sample size is small, it is likely 
that the estimates’ variability will be greater. Similarly, if there is no ‘publication bias’, the 
graph depicting sample size and effect size should be symmetrical. 
Table 6 shows the results from the FAT tests. The key issue is the significance of the 
intercept and its sign, which in turn reflects the sign of the bias (Stanley 2008). Here, both in 
FAT (1) and FAT (2), the constant is negative and significant at the 1% level, which means 
‘publication bias’ is a relevant concern in our database. Furthermore, we can analyze the 
presence of a genuine empirical effect – regardless of the ‘publication bias’. The meta-
significance test (MTS) is based on the ability of the statistical power to provide evidence of a 
genuine empirical effect based on the relation between the t-value and the degree of freedom. 
According to the MTS result shown in Table 6, we can see that this genuine effect is negative; 
that is, we find a genuine negative effect of IMC on costs. This, in turn, helps to explain the 
results of FAT(1) and FAT(2). 
Table 6. Funnel asymmetry (FAT) and meta-significance (MTS) tests 
 FAT(1) FAT(2)  MTS 


















#observations  111  111  111 
R-squared 0.012 0.004 0.047 
F 11.19*** 0.79 6.65** 
Note: (robust) standard errors in parenthesis; ***Significant at 1 percent level; **Significant at 5 percent level; 
*Significant at 10 percent level 
 
To assess the potential effect of publication bias on our results, we have estimated two 
FAT meta-regressions (Stanley, 2005), replacing sample size first with study precision (the 
inverse of standard error) and then with the square root of sample size. Both FAT meta-
regressions, employing the two different estimation techniques, give identical results to those 
found in our original meta-regressions, above all in the case of the theory-related variables. 
Table 7 shows the results of the FAT meta-regressions. For the sake of simplicity, we include 
only the GEE estimation (OLS, Robust OLS and GLS results are available upon request). Thus, 
we can conclude that ‘publication bias’ does not undermine our results. 
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Table 7. FAT meta-regressions 
 FAT1 GEE FAT2 GEE 





SQRSampleSize - 0.014 
(0.009) 
 






































#observations 111 111 
Wald(Chi)2 908.43 423.39 
Prob>(Chi)2 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Note: (robust) standard errors in parenthesis. ***Significant at 1% level; **Significant at 5% level; *Significant 
at 10% level 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This study has sought to provide an explanation for the diverging empirical results of the effects 
of inter-municipal cooperation on service delivery costs, and, within this framework, to 
determine whether theoretical expectations about IMC play a relevant role in explaining these 
results. We have paid particular attention to hypotheses concerning economies of scale, service-
related transaction costs and governance arrangements. 
After carefully building a database of all homogenous multivariate studies that have 
addressed the issue, we employed a meta-regression methodology. We obtained interesting 
insights into the role played by the environmental and technical variables; thus, studies that 
focus on single services and those that employ panel data tend to find greater cost advantages 
of IMC. More importantly, we found that studies conducted in municipalities with small 
population sizes tend to find ICM more cost advantageous, which is consistent with the 
hypothesis we formulate in relation to scale economies. We also found that the studies in which 
the governance of cooperation is delegated to supramunicipal governments tend to find ICM 
more cost advantageous. However, we did not find any significant overall relationship between 
service-related transaction costs and the cost advantages of IMC. When decomposing 
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transaction costs into asset specificity and contract management difficulty we found a slightly 
significant positive effect of transaction costs on the cost advantages of ICM. These results, 
though, should be treated as preliminary findings because they are neither systematic across 
estimations, nor statistically strong. Indeed, more empirical research on transaction costs and 
IMC is encouraged.  
Our research provides interesting results with considerable implications for the effects 
of IMC on costs. Unfortunately, however, we have not been able to consider here questions of 
service quality, given that the empirical evidence is extremely scarce. Yet, we believe the main 
implication that can be drawn by policy makers from our results is that ‘one size does not fit 
all’: IMC can be cost advantageous for some services, but not for others. The possibility of 
exploiting scale economies, particularly in the case of small municipalities, seems to be 
robustly associated with cost savings. Moreover, just how the governance of the cooperation is 
arranged matters, highlighting the need to give careful consideration to the coordination and 
supervision costs involved. 
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